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PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
No. 14-1558 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
 
v. 
 
MICHAEL WRIGHT, 
     Appellant 
_____________ 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Crim. No. 5-09-cr-00270-001) 
District Judge: Honorable Lawrence F. Stengel 
_____________ 
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)  
on October 21, 2014 
 
Before: AMBRO, FUENTES, and NYGAARD, Circuit 
Judges 
(Filed: February 6, 2015) 
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OPINION 
 
FUENTES, Circuit Judge.  
We recently confronted the question of whether 
suppression is required when a law enforcement officer 
obtains a valid search warrant but mistakenly interprets a 
judge’s sealing order as prohibiting him from showing the list 
of items to be seized to the person whose property is being 
searched. See United States v. Franz, 772 F.3d 134 (3d Cir. 
2014). This case presents the related question that arises 
when, as a result of a sealing order, the list of items to be 
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seized is inadvertently omitted from the warrant when it is 
executed.  
 
I. Background of the Case 
 
 Having gathered significant evidence of Michael 
Wright’s ongoing conspiracy to distribute marijuana, the 
United States Attorney’s Office for the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania prepared a warrant application for the search of 
Wright’s apartment. In the portion of the warrant identifying 
the items to be seized, the warrant referred to an attached 
affidavit of probable cause prepared by Drug Enforcement 
Agency Task Force Agent Jeffrey Taylor. The affidavit 
summarized the Government’s knowledge of the conspiracy 
and stated that Agent Taylor expected to find further evidence 
in Wright’s apartment, including drugs, money, and 
documents such as ledgers and telephone lists.  
 
 A federal magistrate judge approved the application, 
signing both the warrant and the attached affidavit. Before the 
warrant was executed, however, the affidavit was removed at 
the request of the U.S. Attorney’s Office and sealed in order 
to protect the ongoing investigation. Agent Taylor, who was 
organizing the raid, received the final warrant but did not 
notice that it no longer included a list of items to be seized. 
As a result, although the magistrate judge had approved the 
list, the list was not present when the warrant was executed. 
The search was nevertheless conducted in conformity with 
the warrant, and there is no indication that items not listed 
were seized.  
 Once criminal proceedings were brought against 
Wright, he filed a motion to suppress the evidence gathered 
from his apartment. Pursuant to our decision in Bartholomew 
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v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 221 F.3d 425 (3d Cir. 
2000), the District Court held that the execution of a warrant 
without Agent Taylor’s affidavit violated the Fourth 
Amendment’s requirement that warrants “particularly 
describ[e] the place to be searched, and the persons or things 
to be seized.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. Although the District 
Court found that Agent Taylor’s culpability was “low,” it 
read the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Leon, 
468 U.S. 897 (1984), as holding that the good-faith exception 
to the exclusionary rule could never excuse reliance on a 
facially invalid warrant. Consequently, it ordered the 
evidence suppressed. 
 
 On appeal, a panel of this Court vacated and 
remanded. The panel acknowledged that the good-faith 
exception was inapplicable under Leon because the warrant 
was facially invalid. It nevertheless held that the Supreme 
Court’s more recent decision in Herring v. United States, 555 
U.S. 135 (2009), required an additional analytical step before 
the exclusionary rule could be applied. Specifically, the 
District Court could not suppress the evidence unless it 
evaluated Agent Taylor’s culpability and found that his 
conduct was at least grossly negligent.  
 
 The District Court denied the motion to suppress on 
remand, finding that Taylor’s failure to review the warrant 
before executing it was a “simple mistake” that conferred no 
benefit on the Government and amounted at most to 
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negligence. Wright was subsequently convicted of drug 
offenses by a jury, and he filed the instant appeal.1  
 
II. Discussion 
 
 The parties agree that evidence was seized from 
Wright’s apartment in violation of the Fourth Amendment. 
Thus, the sole question before us is whether the exclusionary 
rule requires its suppression. We hold that it does not.  
 
A.  The Exclusionary Rule 
 
 Although the exclusionary rule was designed to deter 
Fourth Amendment violations, the heavy social costs of 
suppressing evidence counsel against its indiscriminate 
application. See Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419, 2426 
(2011). Accordingly, in Leon, the Supreme Court created a 
“good-faith exception” to the suppression remedy for 
“evidence obtained in objectively reasonable reliance on a 
subsequently invalidated search warrant.” 468 U.S. at 913, 
922. The Leon Court also observed, however, that “depending 
on the circumstances of the particular case, a warrant may be 
so facially deficient—i.e., in failing to particularize the place 
                                              
1 The District Court had subject-matter jurisdiction under 18 
U.S.C. § 3231. We have jurisdiction to review the District 
Court’s judgment of conviction pursuant to 28 U.S.C.  
§ 1291. “We review factual determinations made on a motion 
to suppress for clear error and legal determinations de novo.” 
United States v. Harrison, 689 F.3d 301, 306 (3d Cir. 2012), 
cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 1616 (2013). 
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to be searched or the things to be seized—that the executing 
officers cannot reasonably presume it to be valid.” Id. at 923.  
 
 The Supreme Court refined the analysis in Herring: 
“To trigger the exclusionary rule, police conduct must be 
sufficiently deliberate that exclusion can meaningfully deter 
it, and sufficiently culpable that such deterrence is worth the 
price paid by the justice system.” 555 U.S. at 144. As a result, 
“the exclusionary rule serves to deter deliberate, reckless, or 
grossly negligent conduct, or in some circumstances recurring 
or systemic negligence.” Id. Simple, isolated negligence is 
insufficient to justify suppression. See Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 
2427-28.  
 
 Our Court has synthesized these cases by explaining 
that when a warrant is “so facially deficient that it fail[s] to 
particularize . . . the things to be seized,” the officers involved 
are usually at least “grossly negligent” and cannot avail 
themselves of the good-faith exception. United States v. 
Tracey, 597 F.3d 140, 151 (3d Cir. 2010). We recently 
clarified in United States v. Franz, however, that this is not a 
categorical rule. 772 F.3d at 144-47. “[I]n examining the 
totality of the circumstances, we consider not only any 
defects in the warrant but also the officer’s conduct in 
obtaining and executing the warrant and what the officer 
knew or should have known.” Id. at 147. Thus, even if a 
warrant is facially invalid, an assessment of the officers’ 
culpability and the value of deterrence may counsel against 
suppression.  
 
 The federal agent who conducted the search in Franz, 
Agent Nardinger, believed that he could not give Franz the 
list of items to be seized because that list had been sealed. His 
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failure to make the list available violated the Fourth 
Amendment’s particularity requirement. The Government 
argued, however, that the good-faith exception applied 
because Nardinger had made a simple mistake that was not 
sufficiently culpable or susceptible to deterrence. This Court 
agreed and affirmed the denial of Franz’s motion to suppress.  
 
 We listed a number of factors in support of our 
conclusion. First, Nardinger “sought and obtained a valid 
warrant and acted in consultation with federal prosecutors.” 
Id. Second, Nardinger had no intention of concealing the 
information that was sealed, as he verbally “explained to 
Franz what items the warrant authorized him to search for and 
seize.” Id. at 148. Third, there was no evidence that the 
constitutional violation in question was “recurring or 
systematic,” rather than an isolated mistake by an 
inexperienced agent. Id. Finally, the magistrate judge’s order 
sealing the supporting documents to the warrant contained 
unclear language that Nardinger interpreted as prohibiting 
him from giving Franz the list of items to be seized. Id. at 
148-49. Accordingly, we could not say that Nardinger acted 
deliberately, recklessly, or with gross negligence. To the 
contrary, his “conduct was, on the whole, objectively 
reasonable.” Id. at 147.  
 
B.  Wright’s Motion to Suppress 
 
 As in Franz, our analysis here focuses on the 
culpability of the agents and prosecutors who failed to ensure 
that a list of items to be seized was attached to the warrant 
that was executed. Wright does not argue that anyone 
deliberately or recklessly violated his Fourth Amendment 
rights. He argues instead that Agent Taylor was grossly 
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negligent and, consequently, that deterrence is worth the price 
of suppression.  
 Franz is instructive but not directly on point. In both 
Franz and this case, the agents obtained valid warrants in 
consultation with federal prosecutors and seized only those 
items authorized by their warrants. In Franz, however, Agent 
Nardinger was inexperienced, and he understood the 
magistrate judge’s sealing order as prohibiting him from 
giving Franz the list of items to be seized. We cannot say the 
same about Agent Taylor, who has extensive experience with 
search warrants and did not interpret the magistrate judge’s 
sealing order as excusing compliance with the particularity 
requirement.  
 
 This is significant for two reasons. First, an “officer’s 
knowledge and experience” bears on whether it was 
objectively reasonable for that officer to believe that the 
search was legal. See Herring, 555 U.S. at 145. Second, the 
Supreme Court has held that the exclusionary rule does not 
apply when an officer “reasonably relie[s] on the Magistrate’s 
assurance that the warrant contain[s] an adequate description 
of the things to be seized and [i]s therefore valid.” Groh v. 
Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 564 (2004) (describing Massachusetts 
v. Sheppard, 468 U.S. 981 (1984)). “Even though Nardinger 
was mistaken, his reliance on the sealing order mitigate[d] the 
blame that necessarily follow[ed] his error.” Franz, 772 F.3d 
at 149. As a result, Agent Taylor is arguably more culpable 
than Agent Nardinger.  
 
 The agents’ relative culpability does not, however, 
answer the question of whether Agent Taylor’s conduct meets 
the standard for gross negligence. “‘Gross negligence’ is a 
nebulous term that is defined in a multitude of ways, 
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depending on the legal context and the jurisdiction.” 57A Am. 
Jur. 2d Negligence § 227. This Court has explained that gross 
negligence has “been described as the want of even scant care 
and the failure to exercise even that care which a careless 
person would use.” Fialkowski v. Greenwich Home for 
Children, Inc., 921 F.2d 459, 462 (3d Cir. 1990) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). By contrast, ordinary negligence 
“means no more than a failure to measure up to the conduct 
of a reasonable person.” Id. (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  
 
 Whether Taylor was “grossly” negligent or merely 
negligent in the “ordinary” sense is difficult to assess if we 
consult only the hornbook formulations of these terms. Did 
Taylor fail to exercise “reasonable care,” or did his failure to 
read the warrant before executing it demonstrate the absence 
of even “scant care”? Fundamentally, the precautions we 
would expect an officer to take depend largely on what might 
happen if he failed to take them. The probable consequences 
of the failure to exercise care are certainly relevant to the 
value of deterrence. In addition, “the value of deterrence 
depends upon the strength of the incentive to commit the 
forbidden act.” Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 596 
(2006). Accordingly, it makes sense to consider (1) the extent 
to which the violation in this case undermined the purposes of 
the Fourth Amendment and (2) what the Government gained 
from the violation.  
 
 The requirement that warrants particularly describe the 
things to be seized has a number of purposes. First, it 
provides “written assurance that the Magistrate actually found 
probable cause to search for, and to seize, every item 
mentioned.” Groh, 540 U.S. at 560; see also Tracey, 597 F.3d 
 10 
 
at 146. Second, it prevents “general searches” by confining 
the discretion of officers and authorizing them to seize only 
particular items. Tracey, 597 F.3d at 146. Third, it “informs 
the subject of the search ‘of the lawful authority of the 
executing officer, his need to search, and the limits of his 
power to search.’” Id. (quoting Groh, 540 U.S. at 561).  
 
 The violation at issue here did not undermine the first 
two purposes of the particularity requirement. This was no 
general search, as Agent Taylor oversaw it and “assured that 
the [other] officers acted in accordance with the warrant’s 
limits.” United States v. Wright, Criminal No. 09-270-ALL, 
2013 WL 3090304, at *9 (E.D. Pa. June 20, 2013). Wright 
does not argue that these limits were exceeded in any way. 
 
 Furthermore, we can be confident that the magistrate 
judge found probable cause to search for and seize every item 
listed in Agent Taylor’s affidavit. When the warrant was 
approved, the affidavit was attached and expressly 
incorporated by reference in the space for identifying the 
items to be seized. Indeed, in addition to signing the warrant, 
the magistrate signed the affidavit, albeit for the purpose of 
certifying that Agent Taylor had sworn to it. See United 
States v. Allen, 625 F.3d 830, 839 (5th Cir. 2010) (noting that 
“the magistrate judge’s signature on the affidavit reduces the 
concern that he did not agree to the scope of the search as 
defined and limited therein”). 
 
 Wright’s reliance on Groh, 540 U.S. 551, and Virgin 
Islands v. John, 654 F.3d 412 (3d Cir. 2011), is misplaced for 
this reason. In Groh, the Supreme Court denied qualified 
immunity to officers who relied on a warrant that failed to 
particularly describe the items to be seized. The portion of the 
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warrant that called for a description of the items to be seized 
instead described the house to be searched. Although an 
attached affidavit contained a list of items to be seized, it was 
not expressly incorporated into the warrant itself. 
Consequently, “[t]he mere fact that the Magistrate issued 
[the] warrant d[id] not necessarily establish that he agreed 
that the scope of the search should be as broad as the affiant’s 
request.” Id. at 561. In John, the agent’s affidavit was “‘so 
lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief 
in its existence entirely unreasonable.’” 654 F.3d at 418 
(quoting Tracey, 597 F.3d at 151). Here, by contrast, there is 
no reason to believe that any aspect of the search was 
unsupported by probable cause. 
 
 The failure to retain the list of items to be seized did 
undercut the third purpose of the particularity requirement, as 
Wright was not informed of the limits of the agents’ power to 
search. Here, too, Franz presents a more compelling case for 
application of the good-faith exception: Agent Nardinger 
verbally explained to Franz what items the warrant authorized 
him to search for and seize. See Franz, 772 F.3d at 148.  
 
 The importance of this distinction is, however, 
questionable. The Supreme Court has observed that “neither 
the Fourth Amendment nor Federal Rule of Criminal 
Procedure 41” requires “the executing officer [to] present the 
property owner with a copy of the warrant before conducting 
his search.” United States v. Grubbs, 547 U.S. 90, 98-99 
(2006). The Fourth Amendment “protects property owners 
not by giving them license to engage the police in a debate 
over the basis for the warrant, but by interposing, [before the 
search], the ‘deliberate, impartial judgment of a judicial 
officer . . . between the citizen and the police,’ and by 
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providing, [after the search], a right to suppress evidence 
improperly obtained and a cause of action for damages.” Id. 
at 99 (second alteration in original) (quoting Wong Sun v. 
United States, 371 U.S. 471, 481-482 (1963)). It is therefore 
unclear how Wright was harmed by his inability to peruse the 
list of items the Government intended to seize at the time of 
the raid on his apartment.  
 
 It follows that the Government gained nothing from 
the Fourth Amendment violation. Even if the list of items to 
be seized had been present at the scene, the agents would 
have collected precisely the same evidence, and Wright 
would have been unable to stop them. The violation in this 
case had no impact on the evidence that could be deployed 
against Wright at trial.  
 
 Wright is undoubtedly correct to point out that 
suppression would incentivize the Government to carefully 
scrutinize each warrant before it is executed. The purpose of 
imposing tort liability for negligence is, after all, to encourage 
individuals to exercise reasonable care. In the context of 
suppression, however, the Supreme Court has unequivocally 
held that deterring isolated negligence is not worth the social 
cost of excluded evidence. See Herring, 555 U.S. at 144 n.4, 
147-48. Only if mistakes of this nature recur with some 
frequency will a criminal defendant be in a position to argue 
that the calculus has changed. See id. at 144.  
 
III. Conclusion 
 
 For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the 
District Court was correct to hold that Agent Taylor was not 
sufficiently culpable for the costs of suppression to outweigh 
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its benefits. The District Court’s denial of Wright’s motion to 
suppress will be affirmed.  
